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STATEMENT OF INTEREST1 
Amici curiae (listed in the Appendix) are 
professors who research and write on the First 
Amendment and religious liberty. They have a strong 
interest in the proper application of the Religion 
Clauses and the church autonomy doctrine.  
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY  
OF THE ARGUMENT 
“The First Amendment protects the right of 
religious institutions ‘to decide for themselves, free 
from state interference, matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’” 
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 
S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020). This principle—known as 
the church autonomy doctrine—is rooted in the 
American constitutional tradition of religious 
freedom. Seeking to escape government intrusion in 
their churches, the Puritans, Quakers, and other 
religious dissenters left England in search of a land 
where they could “elect their own ministers and 
establish their own modes of worship.” Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 182 (2012). “It was against this 
 
 
1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, counsel for amici 
curiae certifies that this brief was not authored in whole or in 
part by counsel for any party and that no person or entity other 
than amici curiae or their counsel have made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. The 
parties have received timely notice and have consented to the 
filing of this brief. 
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background that the First Amendment was adopted.” 
Id. at 183.  
Rooted in both the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses, the church autonomy doctrine is a 
defense that “operates like an immunity from suit as 
to certain discrete subject matters that go to a 
religious organization’s control over the doctrine, 
polity, and personnel that execute its present vision 
or determine its future destiny.” Carl H. Esbeck, 
After Espinoza, What’s Left of the Establishment 
Clause?, 21 Federalist Soc’y Rev. 186, 202 (2020). Far 
from offering religious institutions “a general 
immunity from secular laws,” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 
2060, however, the doctrine simply “protect[s] their 
autonomy with respect to internal management 
decisions that are essential to the institution’s 
central mission.” Id. It “let[s] the church be the 
church.” Carl H. Esbeck, The 60th Anniversary of the 
Everson Decision and America’s Church-State 
Proposition, 23 J.L. & Religion 15, 41 (2008). 
This case involves a minister protesting his 
dismissal from church leadership after having 
“conflicting visions about the growth of the church.” 
Pet.App.45a (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). That is precisely the kind of 
intrachurch power struggle that implicates the 
church autonomy doctrine. Yet the Fifth Circuit 
determined that the district court prematurely 
dismissed the suit, because it is “not certain that 
resolution of McRaney’s claims will require the court 
to interfere” with “purely ecclesiastical questions.” 
Pet.App.48a (Ho, J.). That decision is mistaken. 
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Unlike church property disputes, which may be 
decided by “neutral principles” of law, personnel 
decisions—by their nature—cannot be decided 
simply by “neutral principles.” “As the saying goes, 
personnel is policy.” Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). 
That the minister’s claims are framed under 
state tort law is of no moment. The scope of the 
church autonomy doctrine encompasses torts that 
arise from the minister-church employment 
relationship. While immunity may not attach to all 
tort claims against a religious organization, it 
undoubtably attaches when the claim involves the 
hiring, promotion, or firing of a ministerial employee. 
Indeed, such claims are substantially similar to 
federal nondiscrimination claims, which this Court 
has previously decided fall under the church 
autonomy doctrine. After all, the purpose of the 
doctrine is to prevent the government from 
“interfer[ing] with the internal governance of the 
church.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. Because 
the tort claims here involve internal church 
governance, “[t]his case falls right in the heartland of 
the church autonomy doctrine.” Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). 
This Court should grant the petition and reverse the 
decision below.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The United States has long recognized the 
importance of church autonomy.  
“[T]he right of religious institutions ‘to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of 
church government as well as those of faith and 
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doctrine’” is central to the fabric of American society 
and constitutional heritage. Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 
2055 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)). 
“[T]he Religion Clauses protect a private sphere 
within which religious bodies are free to govern 
themselves in accordance with their own beliefs.” 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., 
concurring). This principle—that “religious 
communities and institutions enjoy meaningful 
autonomy and independence with respect to their 
governance, teachings, and doctrines”—dictates that 
government may not interfere in internal church 
affairs. Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, 
Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial 
Exception, 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 175, 175 
(2011). 
A. Church autonomy in England.  
The church autonomy doctrine is rooted in the 
American constitutional tradition of religious 
freedom. In adopting the First Amendment and 
honoring the right of churches to govern without 
interference, the Founders attempted to “prevent a 
repetition of [British] practices” of government-
controlled decision making in the church. Our Lady, 
140 S. Ct. at 2061. Indeed, those very practices drove 
the Puritans, Quakers, and other religious dissenters 
out of England.  
Magna Carta recognized church autonomy in its 
very first clause. J. Holt, Magna Carta App. IV, P. 
317, cl. 1 (1965). It decreed that the English church 
“shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties 
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unimpaired,” including “freedom of elections”—“the 
greatest necessity and importance to the English 
church.” Id.; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.  
Yet in 1215, actual freedom from government 
interference “may have been more theoretical than 
real.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182; id. at 182 
(noting that Henry II ordered the electors of a 
bishopric to “hold a free election” but forbade them 
from electing “anyone but Richard my clerk”); 
Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are 
Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 St. John’s J. 
Legal Comment. 515, 524 (2007) (identifying 
“constraint[s] to which King John agreed []but did 
not always respect”).  
The English church faced constant interference 
from the Crown in religious decisionmaking. By 
1535, the English monarch reigned as supreme head 
of the English church, with full authority to appoint 
church officials. See The Act of Supremacy of 1534, 
26 Hen. 8, ch. 1; The Act in Restraint of Annates, 25 
Hen. 8, ch. 20. Subsequent laws continued to stifle 
both religious exercise and church autonomy. James 
I proclaimed it “the chiefest of all kingly duties ... to 
settle the affairs of religion.” Documents Illustrative 
of English Church History 513 (Henry Gee & 
William John Hardy eds., 1896). Charles I followed 
suit by requiring all clergy to swear an oath of 
allegiance, “bind[ing] themselves never to consent ‘to 
alter the government of th[e] church by archbishops, 
bishops, deans and archdeacons, etcetera, as it 
stands now established.’” Felix Makower, The 
Constitutional History and Constitution of the 
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Church of England 76 (1895). Though Charles I lost 
his head, Charles II persisted in interfering with the 
church: after restoring the monarchy in 1660, he 
immediately ordered all ministers to pledge their 
allegiance or face being labeled seditious and 
removed from their positions. See Act of Uniformity, 
1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 4.  
John Locke strongly opposed this government 
interference, arguing that it was “utterly necessary” 
to “draw a precise boundary-line between (1) the 
affairs of civil government and (2) the affairs of 
religion.” John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 
3 (1690) (Bennett ed. 2010). Failure to recognize this 
distinction, he warned, would result in endless 
“controversies arising between those who have ... a 
concern for men’s souls and those who have ... a care 
for the commonwealth.” Id. Because government is 
“constituted only for the purpose of preserving and 
promoting” life, liberty, and property, while the 
church “care[s] for the salvation of men’s souls,” id., 
they need different laws. And since members of a 
church “joined it freely without coercion ... it follows 
that the right of making its laws must belong to the 
[church] itself.” Id. at 5.  
Yet the promise of church autonomy remained 
hollow. England continued to “suffer[] from chronic 
religious strife and intolerance.” Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical 
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 
Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1421 (1990). “Seeking to escape 
the control of the national church,” the Puritans 
crossed the Atlantic, searching for a land where they 
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could “elect their own minsters and establish their 
own modes of worship.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
182. Other religious dissenters followed. See id. at 
183. Even those who adhered to the Church of 
England still “chafed at the control exercised by the 
Crown.” Id. 
B. Church autonomy in the United States. 
“It was against this background that the First 
Amendment was adopted.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 
at 183. The centuries-old struggle to free religion 
from government meddling spurred the American 
commitment “to preserv[ing] a church’s independent 
authority” in “matters of faith and doctrine and in 
closely linked matters of internal government.” Our 
Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061. The founding generation 
both “sought to foreclose the possibility of a national 
church” and ensure that the new federal government 
“would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.” 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184. Instead, America 
would honor the “distinctions between [civil and 
religious] spheres, the independence of institution, 
and the ‘freedom of the church.’” Garnett, Religion 
and Group Rights, supra, 523. It would ensure “a 
constitutional order in which the institutions of 
religion—not ‘faith,’ ‘religion,’ or ‘spirituality,’ but the 
‘church’—are distinct from, other than, and 
meaningfully independent of, the institutions of 
government.” Id.  
Such an order required “rejecting a national 
establishment of religion.” Berg et al., supra, 181. In 
doing so, “Americans necessarily rejected a role for 
the federal government to choose church leaders.” Id.  
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“The First Amendment confirms this rejection, as 
do early practices and policies.” Id. For example, 
shortly after independence, the Vatican asked Barbe 
Marbois, the French Minister to the United States 
“to petition Congress for approval to appoint a 
Catholic bishop in the United States.” Carl H. 
Esbeck, Religion During the American Revolution 
and the Early Republic, in 1 Law and Religion, An 
Overview 57, 72-73 (Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo 
Cristofori, eds. 2013). Congress responded by 
directing Benjamin Franklin, the U.S. Minister to 
France, to inform the Vatican and the French 
Minister that “the subject of [their] application ... 
being purely spiritual[] ... is without the jurisdiction 
and powers of Congress, who ha[s] no authority to 
permit or refuse it.” Id. 
Similarly, in 1806, John Carroll, the United 
States’ first Catholic bishop, sought then-Secretary of 
State James Madison’s view about whom to appoint 
as bishop in the newly acquired Louisiana Territory. 
Berg et al., supra, 181. “After conferring with 
President Jefferson, Madison responded that ‘the 
selection of ecclesiastical individuals’—of church 
‘functionaries’—was an ‘entirely ecclesiastical’ 
matter for the Catholic Church to decide, and that he 
would adhere to ‘the scrupulous policy of the 
Constitution in guarding against a political 
interference in religious affairs.’” Id. (quoting Letter 
from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 
1806), reprinted in 20 Records of the American 
Catholic Historical Society 63-64 (1909)); Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184.  
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Jefferson took a similar view when Madison, as 
Secretary of State, informed him in 1804 that local 
authorities had shut the doors of a Catholic parish in 
the Orleans Territory “in response to a conflict 
between two priests concerning who was the rightful 
leader of the congregation.” Kevin Pybas, 
Disestablishment in the Louisiana and Missouri 
Territories, in Disestablishment and Religious 
Dissent: Church-State Relations in the New 
American States, 1776–1833 273, 281-82 (Esbeck & 
Hartog eds., 2019). Displeased, Jefferson wrote back: 
“[I]t was an error in our officer to shut the doors of 
the church. ... The priests must settle their 
differences in their own way, provided they commit 
no breach of the peace. ... On our principles all 
church-discipline is voluntary; and never to be 
enforced by the public authority.” Id.  
Jefferson reiterated the point just eight days 
later in a letter to the Ursuline Sisters of New 
Orleans. “The order’s prioress had written to 
Jefferson asking for assurance that the Louisiana 
Purchase would not undermine their legal rights.” 
Berg et al., supra, 182. Jefferson answered, stating 
that “the principles of the Constitution ‘are a sure 
guaranty to you that [your property] will be 
preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that your 
Institution will be permitted to govern itself 
according to its own voluntary rules without 
interference from the civil authority.’” Id. (citation 
omitted). Jefferson emphasized that the Sisters had 
a “broad right of self-governance and religious 
liberty.” Pybas, supra, 281.  
10 
  
Madison maintained this principle of non-
interference after becoming president. In 1811, he 
vetoed a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal 
Church in Alexandria (which “was then the District 
of Columbia”), Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184-85. 
In doing so, Madison stated that such a law “exceeds 
the rightful authority to which Governments are 
limited, by the essential distinction between civil and 
religious functions, and violates, in particular, the 
article of the Constitution of the United States, 
which declares, that ‘Congress shall make no law 
respecting a religious establishment.’” Id. (quoting 22 
Annals of Cong. 982-983 (1811)). Not only would such 
a bill improperly “comprehend[] ... the election and 
removal of the Minister” but it would also 
“establish[] by law, sundry rules and proceedings 
relative purely to the organization and polity of the 
church incorporated.” Id. 
At bottom, “[w]hat these and other events 
confirm is that many early American leaders 
embraced the idea of a constitutionalized distinction 
between civil and religious authorities.” Richard W. 
Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, 
Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, 
2011-2012 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 307, 313. And such a 
distinction “implied, and enabled, a zone of 
autonomy” over church affairs. Id.  
C. Church autonomy is a defense in the 
nature of an immunity.  
By erecting a barrier between civil authorities 
and religious institutions on matters involving 
internal church governance, the church autonomy 
11 
  
doctrine creates a defense in the nature of an 
immunity. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 
(“[T]he exception operates as an affirmative defense 
to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional 
bar.”); Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 202. Once a 
court determines the doctrine applies, the inquiry 
ends. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95; 
Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 200. 
The church autonomy doctrine “does not mean 
that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity 
from secular laws.” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060. 
“[B]ut it does protect their autonomy with respect to 
internal management decisions that are essential to 
the institution’s central mission.” Id. It gives 
churches “an independence from secular control or 
manipulation—in short, power to decide for 
themselves” how to govern their affairs. Kedroff, 344 
U.S. at 116. Simply put, it “let[s] the church be the 
church.” Esbeck, America’s Church-State Proposition, 
supra, 41. 
Importantly, applying the doctrine does not 
require a showing of religious harm or a religious 
burden if the immunity is not honored. Rather, a loss 
of control over internal governance—a loss of 
autonomy—is itself the harm. That is why, for 
example, this Court rejected the EEOC’s argument 
in Hosanna-Tabor that the school’s proffered 
religious reason (insubordination) for firing the 
petitioner “was pretextual.” Esbeck, After Espinoza, 
supra, 200. The Court explained that such a 
“suggestion missed the point,” because the 
ministerial exception does not exist “to safeguard a 
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church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is 
made for a religious reason.... [t]he exception instead 
ensures that the authority to select and control who 
will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly 
ecclesiastical,’ ... is the church’s alone.” Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194-95. 
 Accordingly, rather than employ a balancing test 
to determine whether the government’s interest 
justifies interfering in the church’s internal 
governance, a categorical immunity applies. See 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195-96. Once a church 
determines whether to hire or fire church personnel, 
then, “there is no follow-on judicial balancing” of that 
decision. Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 200. “There 
is no balancing because there can be no legally 
sufficient governmental interest to justify 
interfering” in a church’s decision not to retain 
unwanted personnel. Id. In such a case, “the First 
Amendment has struck the balance for us.” Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
To be sure, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor applied 
the ministerial exception as a defense by a religious 
employer that had been sued by an employee, 
whereas in this case the North American Mission 
Board did not directly employ Dr. McRaney. Pet.8-10. 
But the employer-employee relationship does not 
define the bounds of the church autonomy doctrine. 
The ministerial exception is “a subset of the church 
autonomy doctrine,” which more broadly shields all 
matters of internal church governance from judicial 
intrusion. Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 201. The 
doctrine includes, for example, the prohibition on 
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courts taking up questions of religious doctrine or 
determining who may be admitted or expelled from 
membership. Those determinations are left to a 
religious entity itself to adjudicate. See infra Section 
II.A. These are not unique free-standing areas of law; 
they all fall under the heading of church autonomy 
doctrine.  
At bottom, church autonomy is a freedom of a 
religious organization to govern its internal affairs 
without interference by government. It is a defense 
that “operates like an immunity from suit as to 
certain discrete subject matters that go to a religious 
organization’s control over the doctrine, polity, and 
personnel that execute its present vision or 
determine its future destiny.” Esbeck, After 
Espinoza, supra, 202; see also Victor E. Schwartz & 
Christopher E. Appel, The Church Immunity 
Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 431, 453 (2011).  
D. This Court has properly treated church 
autonomy as a unique area of law. 
Although the church autonomy doctrine is 
“rooted in the Religion Clauses,” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 190, those clauses “each have their own line 
of cases.” Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 196. So 
under the First Amendment, there are 
Establishment Clause cases, Free Exercise Clause 
cases, and a separate line of church autonomy cases. 
Id. This “distinct, third line of cases … tracks the 
development of church autonomy.” Id. 
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This Court first articulated the church autonomy 
doctrine in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 
(1871). Declining to rule in a doctrinal dispute 
between factions of the Presbyterian Church, the 
Court held that “whenever the questions of 
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, 
or law have been decided by the highest of these 
church judicatories to which the matter has been 
carried, the legal tribunals must accept such 
decisions as final, and as binding on them.” Id. at 
727. It emphasized the “unquestioned” right of 
“voluntary religious associations” to decide for 
themselves “controverted questions of faith” and 
matters of “ecclesiastical government.” Id. at 728-29.  
In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, the Court 
grounded the doctrine in the First Amendment. It 
held that a statute transferring authority and 
property in the Russian Orthodox Church violated 
the First Amendment because “[l]egislation that 
regulates church administration, the operation of the 
churches, [or] the appointment of clergy … prohibits 
the free exercise of religion” and “violates our rule of 
separation between church and state.” 344 U.S. at 
107-08, 110. The Court further explained that 
America offers “a spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations, an independence from secular control 
or manipulation, in short, power to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of 
church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine.” Id. at 116.  
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), this Court “held 
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that the rule of church autonomy from Watson was 
now a First Amendment principle.” Esbeck, After 
Espinoza, supra, 197. In declining to decide “a church 
property dispute which arose when two local 
churches withdrew from a hierarchical general 
church organization,” a unanimous Court concluded 
that the “American concept of the relationship 
between church and state ... leaves the civil court no 
role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the 
process of resolving property disputes.” Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. at 441, 445, 447.2 
Seven years later, in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Court 
 
 
2 The Court has held that courts may employ “neutral 
principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property 
dispute.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979). In such 
cases, courts have the option to “examine certain religious 
documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust 
in favor of the general church.” Id. at 604. “Because churches 
could freely structure their property arrangements as they 
wanted, courts could use general principles of property law to 
discern where the church would have wanted the property to go 
in the event of a split.” Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise 
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 N.w. 
Univ. L. Rev. 1183, 1201 (2014). But neutral principles do not 
allow courts to cast away religious autonomy concerns 
“whenever an ostensibly neutral or secular principle or policy 
seems relevant.” W. Cole Durham & Robert Smith, 1 Rel. 
Organization & the Law § 5:16 (2017). In particular, in 
Hosanna-Tabor, this Court “clearly thought Jones[‘ neutral 
principle rule] irrelevant” because it was an employment, not a 
property, case. Lund, supra, 1201.  
16 
  
“rejected an Illinois bishop’s lawsuit challenging a 
top-down reorganization of the American-Canadian 
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and 
his removal from office.” Esbeck, After Espinoza, 
supra, 197. The Court determined that accepting 
jurisdiction over such a subject matter, would be 
“[in]consistent with the constitutional mandate that 
the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of 
the highest judicatories of a religious organization of 
hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, 
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, 
or law.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713. The Court 
deemed any “detailed review” of internal church 
governance decisions “impermissible under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 718. 
More than three decades later, in Hosanna-
Tabor, this Court unanimously rejected a teacher’s 
challenge to her dismissal from a religious school 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Applying 
the ministerial exception, the Court held that the 
church autonomy doctrine barred the teacher’s claim 
because “[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an 
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing 
to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere 
employment decision. Such action interferes with the 
internal governance of the church, depriving the 
church of control over the selection of those who will 
personify its beliefs.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
188. 
In doing so, the Court affirmed that these 
previous church autonomy decisions are distinct from 
the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause line of 
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cases. This is why, for example, this Court has 
rejected the argument that Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), “precludes recognition of a 
ministerial exception.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
189. The Court “dismissed this argument as having 
‘no merit’” and noted that “Smith does not govern 
‘internal church decision[s] that affect[] the faith and 
mission of the church itself.’” Pet.App.55a (Ho, J.). 
Finally, just last term, this Court again held that 
the ministerial exception—“a subpart of the more 
encompassing ‘general principle of church 
autonomy,’” Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 201 
(quoting 140 S. Ct. at 2061)—barred federal 
employment discrimination claims by two teachers at 
Catholic schools. The Court reaffirmed that “[t]he 
independence of religious institutions in matters of 
‘faith and doctrine’ is linked to independence in ... 
‘matters of church government.’” 140 S. Ct. at 2060. 
And the First Amendment protects “autonomy with 
respect to internal management decisions that are 
essential to [a religious] institution’s central 
mission.” Id.  
II. The church autonomy doctrine 
encompasses torts arising from the 
minister-church employment relationship.  
A. The scope of the church autonomy 
doctrine. 
The purpose of the church autonomy doctrine is 
to prevent the government from “interfer[ing] with 
the internal governance of the church.” Hosanna-
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Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. Precedent teaches that 
“internal governance” generally includes five subject 
areas where “civil officials have been barred 
categorically from exercising [authority].” See 
Esbeck, After Espinoza, supra, 200 & nn. 174-77 
First, civil courts cannot decide “questions of 
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, 
or law,” which are left to a religious entity itself to 
adjudicate. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. 
Although “[i]ntrafaith differences … are not 
uncommon among followers of a particular creed, … 
the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to 
resolve such differences in relation to the Religion 
Clauses.” Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 
450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). This Court has never 
wavered in its admonition that “civil courts [have] no 
role in determining ecclesiastical questions.” 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 447 (emphasis 
added). “Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.” Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716. Nor may 
they “resolv[e] underlying controversies over 
religious doctrine.” Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 
449.  
Second, courts generally cannot interfere with 
the polity of a religious organization. See Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 187. “To permit civil courts to 
probe deeply enough into the allocation of power 
within a hierarchical church so as to decide … 
religious law governing church polity … would 
violate the First Amendment in much the same 
manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.” 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709 (citation omitted). Here, 
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“Baptist ecclesiology is non-hierarchical [and] 
spiritual authority rests with individual 
congregations that then partner with one another to 
advance gospel work on a broader scale.” Pet.5. But 
the church-autonomy doctrine does not protect only 
hierarchical churches. Courts may not “privilege[] 
religious traditions with formal organizational 
structures over those that are less formal.” Our 
Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2064. Indeed, there is no reason 
why a church’s right “‘to establish their own rules 
and regulations for internal discipline and 
government,’” to “control … the selection of those 
who will personify its beliefs,” or to decide “who will 
minister to the faithful” should extend only to those 
churches with a hierarchical structure. See Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 187-88, 195. No matter a church’s 
structure, courts cannot “engage in the forbidden 
process of interpreting and weighing church 
doctrine.” See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 451. 
Nor can they “impermissibly substitute [their] own 
inquiry into church polity,” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 
708, or “[b]y fiat … displace[] one church 
administrator with another,” Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 
119. Such an action “intrudes … the power of the 
state into the forbidden area of religious freedom 
contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.” 
Id.  
Third, the church autonomy doctrine prohibits 
courts from “depriving the church of control over the 
selection of those who will personify its beliefs,” 
precluding judicial interference with ministerial 
employment relationships, including the 
appointment, promotion, and termination decisions 
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of the religious entity. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 
188. Simply put, “the ‘[f]reedom to select the clergy, 
where no improper methods of choice are proven,’ is 
‘part of the free exercise of religion’ protected by the 
First Amendment against government interference.” 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186. So too are decisions 
to remove a clergy member. See Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. at 708-20. These principles formed the 
foundation for the Court’s holding that “the First 
Amendment … precludes application of [employment 
discrimination] legislation to claims concerning the 
employment relationship between a religious 
institution and its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 
U.S. at 188. As the Court recently summarized, “a 
church’s independence on matters ‘of faith and 
doctrine’ requires the authority to select, supervise, 
and if necessary, remove a minister without 
interference by secular authorities.” Our Lady, 140 
S. Ct. at 2060. 
Fourth, the church autonomy doctrine covers 
church membership decisions, including admission, 
discipline, and expulsion. A church’s “very existence 
is dedicated to the collective expression and 
propagation of shared religious ideals.” Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring). 
Therefore, “[f]orcing a [church] to accept certain 
members may impair [its ability] to express those 
views, and only those views, that it intends to 
express.” Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 648 (2000)); see also Bouldin v. Alexander, 
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139-40 (1872) (“[W]e have no 
power to revise or question ordinary acts of church 
discipline, or of excision from membership. … [W]e 
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cannot decide who ought to be members of the 
church, nor whether the excommunicated have been 
regularly or irregularly cut off.”); Watson, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) at 733 (recognizing that matters “concern[ing] 
theological controversy, church discipline, 
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the 
members of the church to the standard of morals 
required of them” are those “over which the civil 
courts exercise no jurisdiction”). 
Fifth, internal communications regarding the 
subject areas described above—faith and doctrine, 
church polity, employment decisions, and 
membership decisions—cannot give rise to liability. 
See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 
289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002). In Bryce, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal of two civil rights 
suits predicated on statements that allegedly 
constituted sexual harassment. Id. at 653, 659. The 
case involved the termination of a youth minister 
after she entered a same-sex civil union against 
church doctrine. Id. at 651-52. Specifically, the 
minister and her partner alleged that 
communications within the church amounted to a 
civil rights conspiracy violation against the partner, 
an individual not employed by the church. See id. at 
657-58. But because the “letters to other church 
leaders discussed an internal church personnel 
matter and the doctrinal reasons for [the] personnel 
decision” and were “part of an internal ecclesiastical 
dispute,” the court found that “[t]he defendants’ 
alleged statements f[ell] squarely within the areas of 
church governance and doctrine protected by the 
First Amendment.” Id. at 658-59. 
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B. The tort claims here fall squarely within 
the church autonomy doctrine.  
Several of these subject areas are implicated 
here. At issue are three tort claims that arise from 
an employment-related ministerial dispute. Dr. Will 
McRaney is a former Southern Baptist minister and 
leader of the Baptist Convention of 
Maryland/Delaware (BCMD), one of denomination’s 
“state conventions.” In that position he “guided the 
direction of the ministry and organization,” 
“screen[ed] and manag[ed] all staff,” and represented 
BCMD in negotiations with the North American 
Mission Board. Pet.App.47a (Ho, J.). In 2014, he sued 
the North American Mission Board, a subdivision of 
the Southern Baptist Convention, after the 
Convention fired him from church leadership 
because of his “conflicting visions” with the Mission 
Board “about the growth of the church.” See 
Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). Because such issues involve 
internal church governance, “[t]his case falls right in 
the heartland of the church autonomy doctrine.” Id. 
The essential facts are undisputed. Dr. McRaney, 
an ordained minister, disagreed with the North 
American Mission Board about a strategic 
partnership agreement (SPA) between them. Pet.6. 
In 2014, the “Mission Board proposed changes to the 
SPA that, in Reverend McRaney’s view, gave the 
SBC Mission Board more control over state 
conventions” like the one he helped lead. Id. By his 
own admission, McRaney “consistently declined to 
accept” the new SPA, which addressed several 
church policies. Id. Because of this refusal, the 
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Mission Board notified the BCMD that it would 
cancel the existing SPA. Id. The BCMD, in turn, 
dismissed McRaney from his church leadership 
position. Pet.6-7. Following his termination, the 
hosts of a large symposium also disinvited McRaney 
as a speaker for an event at which he expected to sell 
a book he authored. Pet.7. He contended that this 
was a direct “result of ‘interference’ by employees of 
the SBC Mission Board.” Id. McRaney then sued the 
Mission Board for defamation, intentional 
interference with business relationships, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. He 
claimed that the Mission Board made “false and 
libelous accusation[s] against him,” “threatened to 
withhold funding from the BCMD unless [he] was 
terminated,” and lobbied to have him “disinvited as a 
speaker” at the mission symposium. Pet.6-7.  
The district court dismissed the suit, concluding 
that McRaney’s claims would require the court to 
determine whether the Mission Board had “valid 
religious reason[s]” for its actions. Pet.App.38a, 41a. 
But the Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that 
McRaney had “ask[ed] the court to apply neutral 
principles of tort law to a case that, on the face of the 
complaint, involves a civil rather than religious 
dispute.” Pet.App.5a. The court ultimately concluded 
that “[t]he district court’s dismissal was premature” 
because it is “not certain that resolution of 
McRaney’s claims will require the court to interfere” 
with “purely ecclesiastical questions.” Pet.App.5a, 8a. 
That decision is mistaken.  
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By concluding that the tort claims might be 
adjudicated based on “neutral principles of tort law,” 
the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted this Court’s church 
autonomy jurisprudence generally and the “neutral 
principles” rule specifically. See, e.g., supra n.4 
(noting that “neutral principles” does not allow 
courts to cast away religious autonomy concerns 
“whenever an ostensibly neutral or secular principle 
or policy seems relevant”); see also Lund, supra, 1201 
(explaining that in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court 
“clearly thought Jones[’s neutral principle rule] 
irrelevant” since it was an employment, not a 
property case). A loss of control over internal 
governance—a loss of sovereignty within the 
protected sphere—is itself the harm the church 
autonomy doctrine protects.  
This Court’s recent cases are instructive. 
Although Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady addressed 
the church autonomy doctrine’s application in federal 
employment discrimination laws, their reasoning 
applies with equal force here. First, as a 
constitutional doctrine “grounded in the Religion 
Clauses,” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190, and 
incorporated against the states, Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), the church autonomy 
doctrine applies equally to federal and state claims. 
Moreover, the state tort law claims here present 
precisely the same constitutional concerns as 
employment discrimination claims. “Allowing secular 
courts to punish religious organizations with 
damages awards for tortiously interfering with a 
minister’s church employment infringes on ‘a 
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religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission through its appointments,’ in violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause.” Pet.20 (quoting Hosanna-
Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89). And “[t]ort damages 
awards to clergy contesting ministerial employment 
decisions, in effect, accord ‘the state the power to 
determine which individuals will minister to the 
faithful,’ in violation of the Establishment Clause.” 
Id.  
At bottom, “[a] former Southern Baptist minister 
brought this suit to protest his dismissal from church 
leadership.” Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). “That fact alone 
should be enough to bar this suit.” Id. The church 
autonomy doctrine does not immunize all conduct 
arising from church operations from state tort 
liability. “[R]egular tort rules,” for example, “apply to 
someone hit by the church bus or by a falling 
gargoyle.” Lund, supra, 1204. It does, however, 
categorically immunize actions concerning who 
should be in leadership and what actions they should 
take on behalf of the church. That is precisely the 
situation here.  
In his complaint, McRaney acknowledges that he 
“was dismissed because he ‘consistently declined to 
accept’ church policy regarding ‘the specific area of 
starting new churches, including the selection, 
assessing and training of church planters.’” 
Pet.App.45a (Ho, J.). He even admitted that his 
“cause of action had its roots in Church policy.” Id. 
Indeed, in his view, it was “a battle of power and 
authority between two religious organizations”—the 
Mission Board and the BCMD. Pet.8. Moreover, 
26 
  
McRaney alleged that the actions that gave rise to 
his claims were “a direct result of [his] refusal to 
accept the new SPA”—an agreement that directly 
concerned various church policies. Pet.App.47a (Ho, 
J.). These are precisely the kind of intrachurch power 
struggles that implicate the church autonomy 
doctrine.  
Because the alleged misconduct fits squarely 
within the categories of conduct shielded by the 
church autonomy doctrine, the judicial entanglement 
must end there. The Fifth Circuit’s wait-and-see 
approach invites judicial scrutiny into ecclesiastical 
matters. But “[t]he First Amendment outlaws such 
intrusion.” Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060.  
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, amici respectfully request 
that this Court grant the petition for a writ of 
certiorari and reverse the decision below.  
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